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Abstract
Increasing evidence suggests that the basic foundations of the self lie in the brain systems that represent the body. Specific
sensorimotor stimulation has been shown to alter the bodily self. However, little is known about how disconnection of the
brain from the body affects the phenomenological sense of the body and the self. Spinal cord injury (SCI) patients who
exhibit massively reduced somatomotor processes below the lesion in the absence of brain damage are suitable for testing
the influence of body signals on two important components of the self–the sense of disembodiment and body ownership.
We recruited 30 SCI patients and 16 healthy participants, and evaluated the following parameters: (i) depersonalization
symptoms, using the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS), and (ii) measures of body ownership, as quantified by the
rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm. We found higher CDS scores in SCI patients, which show increased detachment from
their body and internal bodily sensations and decreasing global body ownership with higher lesion level. The RHI paradigm
reveals no alterations in the illusory ownership of the hand between SCI patients and controls. Yet, there was no typical
proprioceptive drift in SCI patients with intact tactile sensation on the hand, which might be related to cortical
reorganization in these patients. These results suggest that disconnection of somatomotor inputs to the brain due to spinal
cord lesions resulted in a disturbed sense of an embodied self. Furthermore, plasticity-related cortical changes might
influence the dynamics of the bodily self.
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Introduction
The sense of the body, an undeniably important aspect of the
self, is a complex process that requires the integration and
organization of multiple sensory inputs from the somatomotor,
vestibular, exteroceptive, and interoceptive systems. To obtain
a stable bodily self, the brain generates moment-to-moment
representations by integrating and weighting different sensory
inputs according to their reliability [1] and presumably integrating
them into offline body representations (see e.g. [2] for an
alternative distinction). Under normal circumstances, these differ-
ent representations are integrated to form a coherent and accurate
basis for the sense of one’s body and of the self. However, in
various neurologic and psychiatric conditions, as well as during
certain experimental conditions, this integration process may fail
and produce erroneous and disturbed body percepts (see e.g. [3]
for a review). The present study investigated whether the massive
alteration of somatic afferences from the body to the brain and of
motor efferences from the brain to the body affects the multimodal
integration of the remaining sensory inputs with respect to the
sense of the body and of the self. Patients with spinal cord injury
(SCI) with varying injury severity and lesion height can be an ideal
model for testing the influence of somatomotor signals on body
ownership, embodiment, and their interrelation. Depending on
the level and completeness of the spinal cord lesion, these patients
demonstrate more or less pronounced loss of sensory and motor
functions. While corresponding brain functions are intact in these
patients, the loss of somatomotor information about the body part
below the lesion level leads to important structural and functional
cortical reorganization (e.g. [4]), particularly in the somatomotor
areas representing the body. To date, little is known about how
this reorganization changes the phenomenological sense of the
body, such as the feeling of being embodied and ownership for
one’s own body.
The primary aim of this study was to to describe how the
disconnection from bodily somatic, motor, and/or autonomic
functions that results from SCI might alter phenomenological
aspects of self-consciousness depending on the level and com-
pleteness of the lesion. For this purpose, we used a well-validated
scale that includes various possible alterations in the self-
perception, namely the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale
(CDS). Depersonalization and derealization disorder is defined
by the ICD-10 as the feeling that one’s own experiences are
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detached, distant, not one’s own, or somehow lost. Depersonal-
ization has been attributed to a failure of sensory integration into
a preexisting body model [5]. This idea was confirmed by a recent
brain imaging study that associated depersonalization with
functional abnormalities in primary (visual, somatosensory, and
auditory), secondary, and multisensory areas and in areas re-
sponsible for the integration of one’s body schema [6]. Thus, it is
likely that a mismatch between a preexisting body model and
actual sensory input caused by a dramatic loss of sensory input(s)
could cause depersonalization-related symptoms. This hypothesis
has been confirmed by experimental deprivation studies, which
showed that extreme reduction of bodily sensory input in healthy
participants leads to depersonalization symptoms and other
disturbances of self-consciousness (e.g. [7]). In the same line,
patients with acute sensory (i.e., vestibular) loss and resulting
conflicting visuo-vestibular inputs demonstrate stronger symptoms
of depersonalization than do healthy persons [8,9]. We thus
hypothesized that patients with reduced somatosensory input
strength due to spinal cord lesions would show stronger mismatch
between a preexisting body model and sensory input as well as
a stronger inter-sensory (e.g., somatosensory–visual) conflict than
healthy participants, leading to elevated depersonalization scores.
Accordingly, we also hypothesized that greater disturbance of the
self would be associated with increasing conflict, i.e., that there
would be a positive relationship between the depersonalization
score and the extent of somatomotor functional loss (which in turn
would correspond to the spinal height level and completeness of
the lesion).
The second aim of the study was to conduct a detailed
investigation of changes in body ownership, which comprise one
important aspect of bodily self-consciousness; this was accom-
plished using not only phenomenological but also experimental
approaches to quantify objective changes. We used the rubber
hand illusion (RHI) paradigm, which has been used extensively in
recent years, to manipulate and measure body ownership and
investigate the processes that underlie multisensory integration
dominance. In this paradigm [10], the patient’s own hand is
hidden, and a rubber hand is visible. Synchronous stroking of both
the patient’s hidden hand and the visible rubber hand leads to
illusory ownership of the latter. It is commonly assumed that this
illusion occurs because of visual capture of tactile and pro-
prioceptive information in conflicting multisensory situations,
which leads to spatial re-calibration of the location of the touch
with respect to the sensed position of the hand (proprioceptive
drift). We expected that compared to healthy subjects, patients
with SCI would show stronger visual capture, because they have to
rely more strongly on visual cues to localize (affected) body parts
and are thus forced to base multisensory integration on the more-
reliable visual cues. A beautiful narrative description of such
dependence of vision for the bodily self in a paraplegic patient can
be found in a book by Jonathan Cole [11], who describes for
example: ‘‘Her ‘sense of touch’ on the skin, which was amazingly
vivid, seemed dependent on seeing that touch at a certain place
and then elaborating it from a visual to sensory/tactile experi-
ence.’’ Such strong visual capture should result in stronger
proprioceptive drift among patients who have reduced tactile
and proprioceptive hand sensation (i.e., tetraplegic patients) and in
enhancement of illusory body ownership.
This hypothesis is also in line with recent data, which showed bi-
directional influence between the RHI and body temperature:
body temperature and tactile accuracy are decreased during the
RHI [12], and conversely, cooling a limb increases the strength of
the RHI [13]. It can thus be assumed that decreased tactile and
proprioceptive sensitivity (as occurs in tetraplegic patients) will
increase the RHI.
Methods
Ethical Statement
Written informed consent was obtained from all the partici-
pants. The study protocol was approved by the local ethics
committee (IRCCS Ethics Committee at Fondazione Santa Lucia,
Rome, Protocol CE/PROG.309-16) and was in accordance with
the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki.
Participants
Thirty SCI patients (4 females, mean age 40.862.3 years;
Table 1) and 16 healthy subjects (6 females, mean age = 40.362.9
years) were examined. Patients consecutively admitted for
treatment of complications associated with SCI to the Hospital
of the Fondazione Santa Lucia (Rome) were screened for
participation in our project. SCI patients were grouped according
to the level of spinal cord lesion, resulting in a group of 15 patients
with paraplegia, with lumbar or thoracic lesions (mean age,
41.362.9 years), and a second group of 15 patients with
tetraplegia, with cervical lesions (mean age, 40.263.7 years).
The SCIs were of traumatic (n = 23) or non-traumatic (n = 7)
origin, and the time since the lesion onset ranged from 45 days to
18 years (mean time, 38.0618.1 months in patients with
paraplegia and 27.8610?5 months in patients with tetraplegia).
As for the RHI, it is crucial to feel the touch on the hand, so we
excluded from the analysis one subject who was unable to report
any tactile sensation on any finger. Moreover, to perform the RHI
on homogenous samples, we also grouped the patients indepen-
dent of anatomical lesion level, according to complete or reduced
tactile sensation on the back of the left hand.
To assess the reduced tactile sensation, all of the tetraplegic
patients were asked to use a 10-cm visual vertical analogic scale
(VAS) to rate tactile sensation strength compared to the sensation
of the same stroking on the face. Patients in whom stimuli on the
left hand finger were reported as less intense than stimuli on the
face were assigned to the S2group (n = 10, see Figure 1). The
remaining 19 patients did not show any signs of tactile deficit (S+
group).
Neurologic status was assessed according to the American
Spinal Injury Association (ASIA) standards on the basis of the
patients’ motor and sensory scores, lesion level, and neurologic
impairment. The completeness of the lesion was defined according
to the concept of sacral sparing: sensory preservation of the
perianal zone and/or motor function of the external anal sphincter
(preservation of the lower sacral segments). The lesion was
complete in 15 patients (ASIA A) with complete motor and
sensory loss below the lesion level and incomplete in 15 patients
(ASIA B, C, or D). None of the SCI patients had suffered
a concomitant head or brain lesion. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurologic or
psychiatric disease.
Experimental Tasks
Two different tasks, namely the CDS and the RHI paradigm,
were used in order to pinpoint changes in the bodily self among
the different groups. The sequence of tasks was counterbalanced to
exclude any ordering effects.
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale. An Italian version of
the CDS [14] was given to the participants. This instrument is
a well-validated–self-rating scale designed to assess disturbance of
the apparent reality of one’s physical state as well as altered
Bodily Self in Spinal Cord Injured Patients
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perception of bodily experience, symptoms that are thought to
characterize depersonalization and derealization disorder [15].
The questionnaire showed high internal consistency (Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.89) and good reliability (split-half reliability of 0.92)
[14]. The scale comprises 28 items that are rated on 2 separate
Likert scales, one for frequency and the other for the duration of
the symptoms. In accordance with the suggestions provided by
Sierra et al. [16], we calculated the arithmetic sums of the
frequency and duration domains to obtain an index of item
intensity (range 0–10). This analysis was introduced by the authors
to give equal weight to frequent but short-lived and less-frequent
but long-lasting depersonalization experiences. A total score of
,70 indicates a clinically relevant depersonalization disorder. The
scale was adapted in this study by reducing the time period of
reference from the original 6 months to 1 month, to ensure that
the entire period of reference fell within the time after lesion for all
patients (minimum time since lesion was 45 days).
Rubber hand illusion procedure. A classical RHI task [10]
was administered. Each participant was seated in front of a table.
The experimenter placed the participant’s arms in a standard
anatomical position inside a wooden box. Both hands were
covered with pieces of black cloth so the participant was unable to
see them. A life-sized and realistic-looking rubber left hand was
placed inside the box in front of the participant and aligned with
that participant’s midline. The distance between the participant’s
actual left index finger and the index finger of the rubber hand was
fixed at 13 cm. The participant’s actual hands remained covered
during the stroking procedure (stimulation) and the rubber hand
was visible. The participant was asked to maintain visual fixation
on the rubber hand and instructed not to move either their hands
or head during the test phase. Two identical small paintbrushes
were then used to stroke both the rubber hand and the
participant’s hidden hand in two blocks either synchronously or
asynchronously. The order was alternated between subjects. The
brush strokes were applied to the dorsal surface of all fingers for
2 min with an approximate rhythm of 1 brush stroke/s.
Proprioceptive drift. Although a number of objective
measures of the RHI have been employed in recent years (see
Table 1. Demographic and clinical data of the individuals with spinal cord injury.
Case Age
Time since
injury (days) Gender
Lesion
level Etiology
AIS
grade Motor level Sensory level Sensitivity
Left Right Left Right Left hand
P1 19 310 M T10 Traumatic A T10 T10 T10 T10 100
P2 34 66 M L1 Traumatic D L3 L3 L1 L1 100
P3 42 760 M T10 Traumatic A T10 T10 T10 T10 100
P4 42 970 M T9 Neoplastic A T9 T9 T6 T9 100
P5 46 310 M T7 Traumatic A T7 T7 T7 T7 100
P6 35 6480 M T7 Traumatic A T7 T7 T7 T7 100
P7 56 260 M L1 Traumatic C L1 L1 L3 L3 100
P8 35 297 M T10 Traumatic A T11 T11 T11 T11 100
P9 49 45 F T12 Traumatic A T12 T12 T12 T12 100
P10 34 66 M L1 Traumatic A L1 L1 L3 L3 100
P11 42 940 M T3 Traumatic A T6 T6 T6 T6 100
P12 43 55 F T7 Neoplastic C L3 L3 T7 T7 100
P13 65 458 M T4 Traumatic C T4 T4 T4 T4 100
P14 36 130 M T3 Traumatic A T3 T3 T3 T3 100
P15 49 6239 F T7 Neoplastic D L3 L3 L1 L1 100
T1 45 70 M C6 Neoplastic D + + C7 C7 27
T2 55 58 M C6 Traumatic B C6 C6 + + 100
T3 38 165 M C4 Traumatic A C4 C4 C4 C4 0
T4 30 180 M C6 Traumatic A C6 C6 C6 C6 74
T5 31 393 M C6 Traumatic B C6 C7 C6 C6 95
T6 39 580 M C4 Traumatic A C5 C5 C4 C4 54
T7 46 700 M C7 Vascular D C8 C8 + + 100
T8 19 285 M C6 Traumatic B C5 C5 C7 C7 66
T9 27 59 M C6 Traumatic B T1 T1 + + 100
T10 61 605 M C7 Vascular D C7 L3 C7 C7 50
T11 71 2160 M C8 Vascular D C8 C8 C8 C8 66
T12 29 3600 M C5 Traumatic A C6 C6 + + 100
T13 28 3639 M C6 Traumatic C C5 C5 C8 C8 97
T14 35 190 M C6 Traumatic A C6 C6 C6 C6 48
T15 41 57 M C5 Traumatic C C8 C8 C5 C5 31
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050757.t001
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e.g. [17] for a review), is thought to be an objective measure of
how well a rubber hand is integrated into the participant’s body
schema. Successful capture of visual stimuli that convey pro-
prioceptive and tactile cues is thought to bias the apparent location
of the arm after synchronous stroking to produce the RHI. To
evidence such an effect, immediately after the stimulation,
a wooden board with a ruler was inserted into the box covering
the participant’s real hands and the rubber hand. The participant
was instructed to verbally indicate under which number on the
ruler the middle point of their left index finger was located. They
were instructed to be as precise as possible and to report the values
in centimetres and millimetres. To avoid response bias, the ruler
was attached to the board using a hook-and-loop fastener to allow
for systematic variance of the offset in each trial. Proprioceptive
drift was measured as the difference between the number indicated
by the participant and the offset of the ruler measured in
centimetres.
Subjective ownership. After each block, the participants
filled out an Italian version of the 9-item questionnaire regarding
their subjective perceptions of illusion during the stimulation [10].
The participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement
with each item on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (‘I totally
disagree’) to +3 (‘I totally agree’). The first three questions were
designed to capture the experience of the illusion in its two
components of referred sensation (Q1 and Q2) and sense of hand
ownership (Q3), whereas the other questions were designed to be
control questions.
Procedure for assessing the proprioceptive baseline. To
determine the individual baseline concerning the perceived
position of the occluded left index finger, the participants were
asked to localize their index finger 5 times prior to start the RHI
stimulation. The participants were seated in front of the same
wooden box, but in this baseline procedure, the box was always
covered with the wooden board. The participants were instructed
to close their eyes. They were asked to then open their eyes and
indicate under which number on the ruler the middle point of
their index finger was located (as described above) and then close
their eyes again immediately (see [18] for a similar approach). To
eliminate response bias, the offset of the ruler was changed before
each of the 5 trials.
Results
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale
A non-parametric comparison (Mann-Whitney U test) sug-
gested that the total CDS score (the arithmetic sum of all items,
including frequency and duration) differed between the SCI
patients and healthy participants (z = 1.93, p = 0.05), with the
former having higher scores (mean6SEM: 41.166.1) than the
latter group (22.863.6). However, no significant difference in total
CDS score was found between patients with paraplegia and those
with tetraplegia (z = 0.57, p = 0.5). Further, in order to better
characterize which specific aspects of the bodily self are altered in
patients, we identified items with maximal between-group
variations by comparing the scores for each item between groups
separately. Only the following 3 items were found to differ
significantly between the healthy subjects and those with SCI:
‘Parts of my body feel as if they don’t belong to me’ (z = 3.7,
p.0.001; Item 3), ‘I have to touch myself to make sure that I have
a body or a real existence’ (z = 2.9, p = 0.004; Item 27), ‘I seem to
have lost some bodily sensations (e.g. of hunger and thirst) so that
when I eat or drink, it feels like an automatic routine’ (z = 2.3,
Figure 1. Subjective rating of tactile sensation on the stimulated hand in the S2 group. Percentages indicate the strength of tactile
sensation on each finger compared to the face and is represented as a gray scale from white (no sensation) to black (complete sensation, as on the
face). The hands are sorted from the top left to the bottom right by the mean values, which are added to each hand numerically.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050757.g001
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p= 0.02; Item 28). These three items also showed a group effect
when categorized as healthy, paraplegic, and tetraplegic, revealing
increasing scores from healthy participants to tetraplegic patients
(Pearson’s chi square; Item 3: x2 = 14.6, p = 0.001; Item 27:
x2 = 8.3, p = 0.016; Item 28: x2 = 6.2, p = 0.045; Figures 2).
Furthermore, Item 3 showed a slight positive correlation between
lesion level and CDS score (Spearman correlation; r = 0.36,
p = 0.05).
Baseline as a Measure of Proprioceptive Accuracy
Participants’ judgment regarding index finger position in the
absence of stimulation was comparable between the groups as
indicated by the 263 analysis of variance (ANOVA; judgment
pre/post6 group) using the average index finger position judged
at baseline, which showed no significant group effect (F(2,42) = 0.02,
p = 0.89), no difference in pre-and post illusion baseline judgment
(F(1,42) = 0.06, p= 0.80), and no significant interaction
(F(2,42) = 0.35, p = 0.56). Furthermore a 263 ANOVA (pre/post
6 group) on the standard deviation suggested that there was no
difference in accuracy between groups (F(2,42) = 0.23, p = 0.79), no
difference between pre- and post-experimental judgment
(F(1,42) = 3.1, p= 0.09, slight tendency toward decreased standard
deviation after the experiment), and no interaction (F(2,42) = 0.04,
p = 0.96). Therefore, errors in hand localization per se are unlikely
to play any role in the 3 groups. However, while we found
comparable accuracy between the groups, correlative analysis
suggested an association between standard deviation in the
baseline proprioceptive measure (i.e. precision in the task) and
CDS score (Spearman’s rho= 0.47, p= 0.001; Figure 2 right
bottom).
Rubber Hand Illusion
To obtain an overview of the distribution of the two different
components of the illusion between the groups, four categories
were defined according to the presence or absence of the illusion as
quantified by the questionnaire and according to the presence or
absence of proprioceptive drift. The illusion was considered
present (Q+) with a positive score on question 3, ‘It felt as if the
Figure 2. A–C) Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS) items with significant differences between the healthy subjects and the
SCI patients A) Item 3 ‘Parts of my body feel as if they don’t belong to me’; B) Item 27 ‘I have to touch myself to make sure that I
have a body or a real existence’; C) Item 28 ‘I seem to have lost some bodily sensations (e.g. of hunger and thirst) so that when I eat
or drink, it feels an automatic routine’. Higher scores indicate increasing agreement with the statement. D) Significant correlation between the
standard deviation of the proprioceptive judgment (i.e. accuracy in their baseline judgment) and the total CDS score.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050757.g002
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rubber hand was my hand’ [19]. Drift was defined as present (D+)
when a larger proprioceptive drift was measured in the synchro-
nous condition than in the asynchronous condition (Table 2). Such
a drift is thought to be an objective measure of how strongly the
rubber hand is integrated into the participant’s body schema and
a reliable measure of visual capture of touch and proprioception.
Analysis of the contingency table using the chi square test
indicated a significant difference among the 3 groups (x2 = 13.5,
p = 0.04). The data suggested that healthy participants pre-
dominantly experienced a complete illusion. Patients with para-
plegia most often experienced an illusion but no proprioceptive
drift, while a different pattern was observed in patients with
tetraplegia: about half of the patients did feel complete illusion
while the other half did not show either drift or illusion.
To better characterize the 3 groups, the proprioceptive drift and
subjective report data were analyzed separately. The propriocep-
tive drift, which was normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test for all
conditions: p.0.20), was analyzed using a mixed model ANOVA
with stroking (synchronous/asynchronous) as a within-subjects
factor and subject group (healthy/paraplegic/tetraplegic) as
a between-subjects factor. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were
performed using the Sidak test. The questionnaire data were not
normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test in all conditions: p,0.05);
thus, we used a Kruskal–Wallis test for the between-group factor
Group and the Wilcoxon test for the within-group factors of
Synchrony and Question.
Proprioceptive drift. A 263 mixed-model ANOVA (syn-
chrony/asynchrony X group) for proprioceptive drift showed
a significant main effect of synchrony (F(1,42) = 6.7, p = 0.01) and
a significant interaction effect between group and synchrony
(F(1,42) = 3.3, p = 0.048). Post-hoc test results indicated that healthy
participants showed a typical significantly higher drift during
synchronous stroking versus asynchronous stroking (p = 0.003;
Sidak comparison), while patients with tetraplegia demonstrated
only a trend in the same direction (p = 0.07) and no difference was
observed in patients with paraplegia (p = 0.65).
To determine if the reduced tactile sensation in the left hand
that characterized tetraplegic patients (see Figure 1) is associated
with response to RHI, we regrouped the patients into those with
intact tactile sensation in their left hands (S+) and those with
reduced tactile sensation (S2). We then conducted the ANOVA
(synchrony/asynchronous 6 group (S+, S2, healthy subjects)
again, which indicated a main effect of synchrony (F(1,42) = 9.3,
p = 0.004, larger drift after synchronous stroking) as well as an
interaction with group (F(2,42) = 4.2, p = 0.02; Figure 3). Post-hoc
comparisons show that synchrony influenced proprioceptive drift
in healthy (p = 0.003) and in S2 patients (p = 0.03) but not in S+
patients (p = 0.40). Further, the drift in the synchronous condition
was significantly smaller in the S+ group than in the S2 group
(p = 0.04). Thus, proprioceptive drift appears linked to sparing of
peripheral tactile afferences in SCI patients, tentatively suggesting
that reorganization in SCI patients may be driven by tactile-
dependent mechanisms.
Questionnaire. The descriptive results of the questionnaire
data are shown according to the group, synchrony and questions
(illusion-relevant versus illusion-irrelevant, see [10]) in Table 3.
The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no significant effect of group (all
p values.0.05) on either illusion-relevant or -irrelevant items after
either synchronous or asynchronous stroking. However, within
each group, an effect of synchrony was evident for the illusion-
relevant questions (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, all p values
,0.01). Furthermore, in all groups, there was a significant
difference between the illusion-relevant and -irrelevant questions
only after synchronous stroking (all p values ,0.01; asynchronous
stroking: all p values .0.05). The results thus suggest a strong
illusion, as evidenced by the classic RHI questionnaire in all
groups, but there seems to be no significant modulation between
groups.
Correlation between proprioceptive drift and
questionnaire. We found a significant non-parametric Spear-
man’s correlation between drift and illusion-relevant questionnaire
scores after synchronous stroking in healthy participants (r = 0.62,
p = 0.01), but not in paraplegic (r = 0.41, p = 0.12) or tetraplegic
(r = 0.08, p= 0.78) patients. When the results were expressed as
relative values to those observed in the asynchronous condition,
the correlations between drift and questionnaire data were not
significant in any of the groups (all p values .0.05).
Discussion
In this study, we used a depersonalization questionnaire and the
RHI paradigm to investigate changes in 2 different aspects of the
sense of the body and of the self in patients with altered peripheral
somatosensory and motor processing due to SCI. Three important
new findings were obtained: (1) SCI patients showed elevated
depersonalization scores. (2) The results obtained using the RHI
paradigm suggest that illusory body ownership is not significantly
altered in SCI patients compared to healthy participants. In
particular, no evidence was found to support the enhancement of
visual capture in patients with tetraplegia. (3) Rather surprisingly,
in patients with left hand intact tactile sensation, illusory body
ownership did not result in a proprioceptive drift as it does in both
healthy subjects and patients with reduced tactile sensation.
Disownership and Feelings of Detachment from One’s
Own Body
Increased depersonalization symptoms were observed in SCI
patients, especially in those with tetraplegia. It has been postulated
that depersonalization symptoms can be attributed to an
‘alteration in the usual mechanism of comparison of immediate
sensory perception with memory records’ [5]. Such a mismatch
between online sensorimotor processing and the cortical sensori-
motor representation of the body (also compare [20]) could have
caused the increase in depersonalization symptoms in SCI
patients. Similar mismatch mechanisms between actual sensory
input and the cortical body representation have been suggested to
underlie phantom pain and other phantom sensations, which are
commonly observed after SCI [21,22,23]. Yet, as there was no
correlation between the duration since the lesion occurred and the
CDS score, a more plausible alternative explanation is, that
a mismatch between online visual and proprioceptive information
about the body (i.e. seeing the body but not feeling it), could
Table 2. Overview of the participants grouped according to
the presence or absence of subjective (illusory ownership as
measured by Q3 in the questionnaire) and objective
(proprioceptive drift) measures of rubber hand illusion.
Category
Group Q–D- Q–D+ Q+D2 Q+D+
Healthy 2 2 2 10
Paraplegic 1 1 8 5
Tetraplegic 5 2 1 6
The category with the highest prevalence in each group is indicated in bold.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050757.t002
Bodily Self in Spinal Cord Injured Patients
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 November 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e50757
underlie the elevated scores. A discrepancy between visual and
bodily (i.e. vestibular) signals has been suggested to underlie high
depersonalization scores in patients with vestibular lesions [8,9]. It
should, however, be noted that the CDS includes various aspects
of depersonalization and derealization symptoms ranging from
emotional numbness to problems with autobiographical memory
[24].
The results described here suggest that SCI patients differ from
healthy participants, mainly in 2 subcomponents. First, the SCI
patients showed higher detachment from their internal sensations.
This finding is in line with the literature that suggests decreased
interoceptive sensitivity and awareness in SCI patients, pre-
sumably due to autonomic disturbances [25]. Second and more
relevant in the context of this study, SCI patients showed higher
feeling of detachment from their bodies in that they reported that
they often felt as if their bodies did not belong to them, leading
them to compulsively touch or pinch their leg with their hand to
reassure themselves of their bodily existence. The score concerning
disturbed body ownership further correlated with spinal cord
lesion height, suggesting that lesions affecting more body segments
cause greater disturbance of body ownership. This finding
indicated a direct link between the feeling of body ownership
and peripheral somatosensory and motor processes and is in line
with findings of decreased feeling of body ownership in patients
with locked-in syndrome [26]. Our results may suggest that
therapies to reinforce a patient’s body ownership should be
developed for the treatment of SCI patients.
Independent of the presence of a spinal cord lesion was
a correlation between proprioceptive accuracy of the index
finger (as measured by the mean deviation of several
consecutive localization measurements) and the CDS total
score. This correlation suggests that higher CDS score is
associated with less precise proprioceptive feedback. The finding
could be related to clinical literature suggesting that patients
with schizophrenia or related symptoms show deficits in
proprioception (e.g. [27]), sensory deprivation studies that
related lack of proprioceptive updating to disturbed self
processes [7], literature showing that dopaminergic drugs induce
both alteration in the perception of the bodily self as well as
decreased proprioceptive sensitivity [28], and the theoretical
assumption outlining the importance of proprioception in the
construction of the sense of self. However, as the task was not
designed as a proprioceptive acuity task, these findings are
rather explorative and should be taken with caution.
Figure 3. Significant interaction between group (SCI+, SCI-, healthy) and synchrony (synchronous, asynchronous stroking) for
proprioceptive drift (mean 6 SEM). The values plotted are as compared to the baseline. * p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050757.g003
Table 3. Mean score and standard error for each group in the illusion relevant (average of Q1–Q3) versus the illusion-irrelevant
(average of Q4–Q9) items of the rubber hand illusion questionnaire after synchronous and asynchronous stimulation.
Group Q1–Q3
Wilcoxon test Q1–
Q3 Q4–Q9
Wilcoxon test Q1–Q3
vs Q4–Q9 Q1–Q3 Q4–Q9
Wilcoxon test Q1–Q3
vs Q4–Q9
Healthy 4.9 (60.5) p= 0.001 2.8 (60.3) p= 0.001 1.8 (60.2) 2(60.2) p= 0.33
Paraplegic 5.5 (60.5) p= 0.001 2.3 (60.4) p= 0.001 2 (60.4) 1.6 (60.3) p= 0.17
Tetraplegic 4.2 (60.6) p= 0.003 1.9 (60.3) p= 0.003 1.5 (60.3) 1.3 (60.1) p= 0.48
Values above 4 correspond to an affirmation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050757.t003
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Illusory Ownership of a Fake Hand
Illusory body part ownership of a fake hand as measured by
the RHI questionnaire [10] was not differentially affected
among the groups. Even though Table 1 suggests that
tetraplegic patients experienced an illusion less often than
healthy participants and paraplegic patients as determined by
the questionnaire, this could not be evidenced statistically using
nonparametrical factor analysis. The data thus showed only
a main effect of the synchrony of stroking, revealing a stronger
illusory ownership for the rubber hand during synchronous
compared to asynchronous stroking in all groups. This is
a classic and very robust finding in the RHI paradigm (e.g.
[10]) and has been linked to the fact that during synchronous
stroking, the brain merges the observed and felt stroking into
a single perception. In healthy participants as in SCI patients,
this visual capture of touch thus leads to an illusory feeling of
ownership and to an illusory sensation of touch indicating that
ownership of a fake hand can be induced to a similar extent in
patients with body-brain disconnection and in healthy partici-
pants. Therefore, multisensory illusions may represent a tool for
altering and restoring disturbed feelings of body ownership,
subjective sensation of touch, and embodiment in SCI patients.
For example, long-term exposure to multisensory illusions, such
as embodiment of a virtual avatar or a wheelchair or illusory
projection of touch onto body parts with lost/decreased tactile
sensation, could help patients to gain alternative embodiment.
Similarly, illusions based on visual capture have been success-
fully used to induce illusory body ownership and decrease
neuropathic pain in paraplegic patients [29].
Ownership of Body Parts Versus General Body Ownership
Interestingly, while the CDS data suggest disturbed body
ownership among SCI patients, especially in those with high lesion
levels, illusory ownership of a fake hand (as measured by the RHI
questionnaire) was not significantly different among the groups.
This apparent discrepancy in the results may be explained by the
following 3 lines of evidence, which are listed in order of increasing
degree of relevance.
First, it is important to account for the differences in scales
between the 2 questionnaires. While the scale of ownership used in
the RHI questionnaire indicates the strength of the illusion, the
frequency and duration of the illusion are captured by the CDS.
The 2 measurements are also dissimilar in terms of the time period
of reference (the RHI questionnaire asks only about the last 2
minutes, while the CDS addresses a much longer time period) as
well as focusing differently on spontaneity (the RHI questionnaire
asks about the effects of a specific stimulation, while the CDS
inquires regarding spontaneous changes in the self).
Second, we should consider that the RHI questionnaire asks
participants about illusory ownership of a rubber hand, while the
CDS measures changes in actual body sensation. Thus, one may
speculatively suggest that disturbed actual body ownership among
SCI patients might increase their propensity to experience illusory
ownership of a fake or alternative body part.
The third (and possibly most important) line of evidence
concerns the fact that the RHI questionnaire specifically targets
body ownership of the stimulated left hand, while the CDS
questionnaire inquires about embodiment and ownership in
general. Important differences have been described between
global body ownership and body part ownership (see e.g. [30]
for a discussion). It could thus be suggested that SCI patients
demonstrate disturbed aspects of the global self, while their
body part ownership (specifically that of the hand) is still intact.
Lack of Drift in Patients with Paraplegia
While no difference in the level of illusory ownership was
evidenced between groups, evidence for the proprioceptive drift
classically found in the RHI (see e.g. [30] for a related discussion)
was found in healthy participants and tetraplegic patients, but not
in paraplegic patients. At first glance, this group difference might
seem surprising because hand somatomotor functions are entirely
intact in paraplegic patients and no difference compared to
healthy participants would be expected. Furthermore, results of
regrouping the patients according to functional level suggest that
the same pattern is found in tetraplegic patients with intact
somatosensory hand functions. Interestingly, important adaptive
processes for the remaining input from the spinal cord in the
process of establishing a new body reference have been described
in SCI patients. At the functional level, it has been convincingly
demonstrated that even loss of sensory input due to massive
disconnection of lower limb can induce reorganization of the
cortical representation of the finger (e.g. [31]) and hand [4] with
a shift towards the somatomotor leg area. At the structural level,
studies confirm the presence of reorganization due to expansion of
the remaining afferents into deprived cortical (primary sensory
cortex; [32]) and subcortical areas [4]. This is followed by a large-
scale cortical reorganization, mainly due to reduction of gray
matter in areas representing the lower limb [32].
We suggest that these strong changes in somatomotor and
higher-level body areas may underlie the lack of a proprioceptive
drift, even with a preserved perceptual illusion of ownership for the
rubber hand. Neural correlates of the RHI have shown to mainly
involve the sensorimotor, premotor, parietal, and insular areas
[4]); all areas that may partially be reorganized in patients with
paraplegia. Interestingly, a recent PET study in healthy partici-
pants [33,34,35] found a negative correlation between the
proprioceptive drift and neural activity in the contralateral
primary and secondary somatosensory cortices. The authors
suggested that individuals with a small or negative drift show
a strong internal proprioceptive representation of the body that is
not captured by vision. Thus, it might be that the enlarged hand
representation in the sensorimotor cortex due to cortical re-
organization [34] strengthens the internal somatosensory body
representation and thus prevents the overwriting of proprioceptive
information through visual capture. It should be noted that such
a hypothetical increase in the somatosensory representation did
not prevent the occurrence of RHI [4] but only prevented the
illusion from overwriting proprioceptive information regarding
hand localization. This finding is supported by increasing evidence
that the subjective experience of illusory ownership and limb
recalibration may be two dissociated aspects of the RHI paradigm
[35], which can be differentially affected by sensorimotor disorders
(see e.g. [36] for a discussion).
Of course, dramatic cortical reorganization has also been
observed in tetraplegic patients; however, as the somatomotor
functions of the hand are also affected, a small increase in the
cortical hand representation in S1 is expected and the face area is
expected to extend to the hand area. Nevertheless, as all
tetraplegic patients included in this study had at least some
residual sensory input from the hand, a similar mechanism as
hypothesized for paraplegic patients could have impeded the
stronger visual capture and resulted in larger drift in tetraplegic
patients as we hypothesized. This is in line with the present study’s
finding of a significant correlation between the objective and
subjective dimensions of the RHI in healthy subjects but not in
SCI patients, suggesting that the integrity of afferent and efferent
connections between the body and the brain is necessary in order
to fully induce this illusion. Further research, especially neuroima-
Bodily Self in Spinal Cord Injured Patients
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ging studies, will be necessary to directly verify the hypothesis
drawn in the current paper.
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